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Abstract 
 
This study uses a unique and extensive data set from the Hong Kong IPO market to examine the 
theory of adverse selection under two distinct regulatory regimes in relation to underwriters’ 
discretionary power in IPO share allocation. Consistent with Rock’s (1996) theory of adverse 
selection in the IPO market, we show that, prior to the introduction of the clawback provision, retail 
(uninformed) investors were allocated more of the overpriced offerings and less of the underpriced 
issues. However, after the provision is implemented, retail investors have been allocated 
significantly more of the underpriced offerings and less of the overpriced ones. Overall, we find 
that allocation-adjusted initial returns for the retail investors are lower (higher) than the risk-free 
rate pre- (post-) clawback provision. These findings imply that the mandatory clawback provision 
has enhanced the fairness in IPO share allocations among different investor groups and has reduced 
the winner’s curse in the IPO market. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
“… HONG KONG (Dow Jones Investment Banker) – Claw-back rules for retail tranches in Hong Kong IPOs 
are a unique feature of that market. They bring an element of fairness between institutions and the general 
public; however, retail investors have increasingly shunned new issues and also now account for a smaller 
proportion of secondary trading, as compared with a few years ago. Now might perhaps be a good time to 
rethink those provisions, and to grant more flexibility to ECM bankers and issuers to allocate books of 
demand…”  
                                                                                        Dow Jones Investment Banker on 13 September 20111 
 
Several studies show that underwriters’ IPO share allocation policies are biased towards 
institutional investors (see, e.g., Aggarwal et al., 2002; Hanley and Wilhelm, 1995; Ljungqvist and 
Wilhelm, 2002). Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) find that underwriters’ discretion improves the 
pre-market price discovery by inducing informed investors to reveal their information in return for 
a favorable allocation. Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002) examine the hybrid bookbuilding offerings 
conducted in France and the UK. They find that allocation constraints, such as clawback provisions, 
result in smaller price revisions, smaller institutional allocations and greater underpricing.
2
 Bubna 
and Prabhala (2011) find that, in India, when underwriters control the allocation, bookbuilding IPOs 
exhibit lower underpricing than fixed-price IPOs, but such effect dissipates when regulations 
restrict underwriters’ allocation power. The authors interpret their findings as evidence in support of 
the bookbuilding theories, which suggest that underwriters’ control over allocations assists in the 
pre-market price discovery.  
In this study, we investigate the role of underwriters’ allocation power in the IPO process 
from a different perspective. Specifically, we examine whether the introduction of a mandatory 
clawback provision, which restricts the underwriters’ control over allocation, mitigates the adverse 
                                                 
1
 Further details on this issue can be found at http://www.ipo-book.com/blog/2011/09/20/scrapping-the-claw-back-rules/ 
2
 They include 19 Hong Kong hybrid offerings to provide international evidence on institutional allocations, and find that institutions 
receive 65% of IPO shares in the allocations. 
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selection costs faced by retail (small/uninformed) IPO investors.
3
 We study firms that are listed in 
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (SEHK). This market provides an interesting setting to examine 
the association between share allocation and clawback provision for at least two reasons. First, prior 
to 26 June 1998, underwriters in Hong Kong had discretion in allocating shares among different 
groups of investors. However, since then, their discretion has been curtailed by the introduction of a 
standardized mandatory clawback provision. Under the mandatory clawback provision, 
underwriters’ allocation power is restricted by requiring them to reallocate to retail investors shares 
that would otherwise have been allocated to institutional investors. Second, underwriters in Hong 
Kong are required to publicly disclose the share allocations made to various parties. Such detailed 
information on allocations is not available in most markets since underwriters are not typically 
required to disclose bids or IPO share allocations (e.g., Bubna and Prabhala, 2011; Welch and 
Ritter, 2002).  
We use Rock’s (1986) information asymmetry framework to assess the impact of the 
mandatory clawback provision on the adverse selection costs faced by uninformed IPO investors 
and the effectiveness of the provision in bringing about fairness among different investor groups. 
Although Rock’s model is generally supported by empirical studies (e.g., Amihud et al., 2003; 
Keloharju, 1993; Koh and Walter, 1989; Levis, 1990), there is no prior work that examines the 
impact of a mandatory clawback provision on the severity of the “winner’s curse” problem faced by 
uninformed IPO investors.
4
 This study seeks to fill the gap and contribute to the literature in the 
following ways. First, we investigate whether the introduction of the mandatory clawback provision 
affects the allocation of shares in underpriced and overpriced issues to investor groups with 
different application sizes. Following previous studies (e.g., Koh and Walter, 1989; Vong and 
Trigueiros, 2009), we use investors’ application size as a proxy for information quality; i.e., we 
                                                 
3
 We use retail, small, and uninformed investors interchangeably.  
4 Boreiko and Lombardo (2011) examine 164 Italian IPOs listed on the Milan Stock Exchange. They show that, despite the presence 
of voluntary clawback, retail investors still end up with more shares in less profitable offerings. 
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assume that retail/small investors and uninformed investors belong to the same group. Second, we 
investigate the impact of the clawback provision on allocation-adjusted initial returns earned by 
different investor groups. Specifically, we argue that, if the mandatory clawback provision mitigates 
the unfair rationing faced by uninformed investors, its introduction should result in a significant 
increase (decrease) in the actual share allocation of underpriced (overpriced) IPOs to uninformed 
investors. The mandatory clawback provision should also result in an increase in the allocation-
adjusted returns earned by uninformed investors. 
We find that uninformed investors receive a higher allocation in overpriced than 
underpriced issues prior to the implementation of the clawback provision. However, post-clawback, 
uninformed investors receive more of the underpriced issues and less of the overpriced issues, 
consistent with the view that clawback provisions mitigate the winner's curse problem faced by 
uniformed investors. Specifically, we find that the chance of an uninformed investor receiving IPOs 
with positive (negative) initial returns is significantly higher (lower) in the post- than in the pre-
clawback-provision period. We also find a significant increase in the allocation-adjusted initial 
returns earned by uninformed investors after the mandatory clawback initiation. The results of the 
multivariate analysis suggest that the impact of the clawback provision on the shares allocated to 
investors with small (large) application sizes remains positive (negative) and significant after 
controlling for listing methods, underwriter’s reputation and other firm and offering characteristics. 
These findings are robust to alternative measures of initial returns, to inclusion of other well-known 
determinants of IPO underpricing and to endogeneity concerns.  
Overall, our results indicate that the introduction of the mandatory clawback in the Hong 
Kong IPO market has improved the way in which uninformed investors are treated in share 
allocations. The implication is that the Hong Kong regulatory authority should resist the 
deregulation pressure to scrap the mandatory clawback provision and other markets should consider 
introducing similar restrictions on underwriters’ discretion in order to promote fairness in the IPO 
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allocation process.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the 
related literature. Section 3 describes the offering and allocation process in the Hong Kong IPO 
market. Section 4 describes our data set and provides some descriptive statistics. Section 5 
discusses the results, while the conclusion is presented in Section 6.  
 
2. BRIEF REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
Overwhelming evidence from the literature suggests that IPOs are typically underpriced. The 
theoretical explanations for IPO underpricing are mostly based on the information asymmetry 
between the different parties involved in the IPO process.
5
 Perhaps the best known and most 
studied explanation is the adverse selection model proposed by Rock (1986). Rock’s model 
suggests that, when underwriters have discretion in allocating IPO shares, the average initial returns 
for uninformed investors should not be statistically different from the risk-free rate. A number of 
studies examine the implications of Rock’s model and find consistent results in different markets 
(e.g., Amihud et al., 2003 (Israel); Keloharju, 1993 (Finland); Koh and Walter, 1989 (Singapore); 
Levis, 1990 (UK); Pons-Sanz, 2005 (Spain)).  
The literature on the pricing and share allocations of bookbuilding IPOs suggests that 
institutional investors are generally favored by underwriters. Aggarwal et al. (2002) report that 
retail investors receive a smaller proportion of highly underpriced US IPOs. They also show that, 
on average, retail investors earn less than institutional investors from the new issues. Michaely and 
Shaw (1994) find that underpricing is lower for IPOs with little participation by institutional 
(informed) investors. Cornelli and Goldreich (2001) find that underwriters allocate more shares to 
investors who provide information through limit price bids. Aggarwal et al. (2002) suggest that 
                                                 
5
 For a detailed summary of international evidence on underpricing and detailed reviews of the theories that have been proposed to 
explain underpricing, see Loughran et al. (1994), Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001), Welch and Ritter (2002) and Ljungqvist (2007). 
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underwriters allocate more shares to institutional investors in IPOs with favorable pre-market 
information, while Jenkinson and Jones (2004) document that underwriters favor long-term 
investors.  
 Several studies also relate underwriters’ allocation discretion to the price discovery process. 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002) argue that constraining underwriters’ allocation discretion reduces 
institutional investors’ allocation and undermines the efficiency of the price discovery process. 
Using a sample of 1,032 IPOs from 37 countries, the authors show that share allocations to 
institutional investors is almost double compared to those received by retail investors. They also 
show that restricting underwriters’ discretion reduces institutional allocations and yields smaller 
price revisions, implying diminished information production. Similarly, Morales-Camarogo (2013) 
finds that the introduction of the clawback provision has had an adverse effect on the price 
discovery of the Hong Kong IPO market. Nevertheless, Chang et al. (2014) find that the price 
revisions of IPOs in Taiwan and Hong Kong are higher than those in the US, even though the dual-
tranche bookbuilding in Taiwan and Hong Kong imposes more restrictions on underwriters’ 
discretion than the US bookbuilding. They argue that the larger price revisions associated with the 
Taiwanese and Hong Kong IPOs are driven by market inefficiency rather than information 
production. Using variance ratios to control for the endogenous heterogeneity of price revisions 
related to underpricing among countries, they show that their results are not contradictory to the 
findings of Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002).      
This study adds to the literature by investigating the extent to which the winner’s curse 
depends on the level of underwriters’ discretion in IPO shares allocations.6 A few markets including 
Italy and the US, allow underwriters complete discretion in determining IPO share allocations to 
both retail and institutional investors. However, France, Germany, the UK, India, Hong Kong, 
                                                 
6
 Our study differs from that of Vong and Trigueiros (2009) who focus on Hong Kong IPO share allocation prior to the 
implementation of the clawback provision.  
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Malaysia, and Singapore, impose constraints on share allocations. For example, fixed-tranche deals, 
in which allocations to different groups of investors are fixed prior to the bookbuilding, are highly 
common in both France and the UK. Automatic clawback provisions, which require underwriters to 
transfer shares from institutional to retail investors when demand is strong, are also present in some 
of the hybrid transactions in the UK.
7
 The Italian clawback provision is much more flexible, as it 
allows underwriters to reallocate shares from retail to institutional investors, and vice versa, without 
any restrictions (Boreiko and Lombardo, 2011).  
In Hong Kong, the allocation between the retail tranche and the institutional tranche were 
determined by the underwriters and the issuers. However, since June 1998, underwriters have been 
subject to a stricter and more standardized clawback provision (see Section 3 below). The 
introduction of mandatory clawback in the Hong Kong IPO market provides us with a unique 
opportunity to investigate the extent to which the underwriters’ discretion affects the severity of the 
winner’s curse in the IPO market.        
 
3. OFFERING AND ALLOCATION METHODS IN THE HONG KONG IPO MARKET 
  
The Hong Kong IPO market has experienced a number of regulatory changes over the last few 
decades. Prior to the early 1990s, most IPOs were conducted through fixed-price offerings. 
Following the listing of the first H shares in July 1993, hybrid equity offerings, which involve a 
Hong Kong subscription for retail investors and an international placing for institutional (both 
domestic and foreign) investors, have become more common.
8
 Allocations between the two 
tranches (subscription and placing) used to be left to the discretion of the underwriters and the 
issuers. However, following the significant decline of shares allocated to the subscription tranche in 
1994 and 1995 (SEHK, 1997), the SEHK amended its listing rules on 26 June 1998 to ensure that a 
                                                 
7
 See Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002) for further discussions on the level of underwriters’ discretion in different markets. 
8
 H shares are defined as shares in companies incorporated in mainland China but listed on the SEHK. Red chips are defined as 
companies incorporated and listed in Hong Kong with controlling Chinese shareholders. 
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minimum of 10% of IPO shares is allocated to retail investors and a mandatory clawback provision 
is adopted in the cases of oversubscribed issues.
9
 Under the mandatory clawback provision, 
underwriters are required to allocate 30% of an issue to retail investors if demand in the 
subscription tranche is between 15 and 50 times the initial allocation, 40% if it is from 50 to 100 
times that amount, and 50% if it is greater than 100 times.  
Underwriters in Hong Kong still enjoy considerable discretion over the method of allotment in 
the case of oversubscribed issues. When shares in the subscription tranche are oversubscribed, they 
are usually allocated by ballot, scaling down or a combination of the two methods.
10 
When balloting 
is used, the chance of receiving an allocation tends (in the vast majority of cases) to be lower than 
unity. This is because the IPO shares are distributed to a reduced number of applicants using some 
form of random selection. Whilst all investors are allocated shares when the scaling-down approach 
is used, each investor receives only a fraction of the total number of shares they have applied.  
 
4. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
Our initial sample includes 936 IPOs. We exclude 27 IPOs, which were listed via introduction and 
their offer prices are not disclosed in the prospectuses. Our final sample consists of 909 IPOs listed 
on the SEHK from January 1990 to the end of 2010. IPO issue statistics, including offer price, gross 
proceeds raised, closing, refund and listing dates, and underwriters, are obtained from the IPO 
prospectuses. Data on underwriters’ allocations are collected from the SEHK. All prospectuses and 
company announcements (excluding financial statements) from January 1990 to December 1999 
are collected from the SEHK. For the period between 1990 and June 1998, Lippo Asia Limited has 
                                                 
9
 For further details, see the SEHK consultation paper (1997). In 1994, the average size of the subscription tranche represented 31% 
of the total issue size, compared to 12.5% disregarding the effect of the clawback and 18.75% taking into account the maximum 
effect of the clawback in 1995. 
10
 See McGuinness (1993) and Vong and Trigueiros (2009) for more detailed descriptions of these methods. 
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provided us with the data on shares allocations for 418 IPOs.
11
 From July 1998 to the end of 2010, 
the data are hand-collected from the allocation fillings o (section on prospectus filings), on the 
SEHK website. The missing allocation results (39) and prospectuses (16) were obtained from the 
Securities and Futures Commission (SFC).
12
   
Our initial dataset comprises about 33.2 million investors’ applications, which spread over 
1,100 different application sizes, ranging from a minimum of 50 shares (South Gobi Energy (SGE), 
listed in January 2010)
13
 to a maximum of 2,515 million shares (Companion Building Material 
(CBM), listed in September 1993).
14
 More specifically, the allocation data show that 3,103 
investors applied for 50 SGE shares, while one investor applied for 2,515 million CBM shares. This 
single CBM investor resulted in the offering being oversubscribed by 36.5 times the IPO shares 
offered. This, in turn, led the SEHK to introduce a new requirement whereby no single application 
should exceed 50% of the shares on offer. We require a minimum of 20 IPOs per application size 
included in the final analysis. For example, within the band of 50 to 15,000 shares, there are 72 
different application sizes. However, we only use 15 of these in our analysis, namely, multiples of 
1,000 up to 15,000 shares. The total number of shares across these application sizes represents 
about 96% of investors’ applications for the shares offered within this band (50 to 15,000 shares). 
We also exclude applications relating to cornerstone and strategic investors, as these investors 
receive full allocation well in advance irrespective of the demand from other investors. In other 
words, allocations to these two groups of investors do not depend on underwriters’ discretion and 
should not therefore be affected by the introduction of the mandatory clawback provision.
15
.   
Altogether, we examine 212 application sizes, ranging from 1,000 shares to over 5 million 
                                                 
11
 We are grateful to David Ng at Lippo Asia Limited for allowing us to use his data for this period. 
12
 We are also grateful to Richard Chow (ex-Director of Enforcement) at the SFC for providing us with the missing allocation results 
and prospectuses. 
13 This company offered 69 million shares and was oversubscribed by over 470 times.  
14 The subscription rate for this company was just over 21 times the 27 million shares offered. 
15 See Espenlaub et al. (2016) for a detailed description of cornerstone and strategic investors in the Hong Kong IPO market. 
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shares. These application sizes represent over 85% of investors’ share applications. Following Vong 
and Trigueiros (2009), we also estimate the allocation-adjusted returns for six different investor 
groups (1-50k; >50k-100k; >100k-600k; >600k-1M; >1M-5M; and >5M). If an investor’s 
application size is a proxy for information quality, it is reasonable to assume that small investors 
and uninformed investors belong to the same group (Koh and Walter, 1989; Vong and Trigueiros, 
2009). Other data, such as the first day’s closing price, the prime rate (a proxy for the borrowing 
rate) and the 7-day Hong Kong Inter-bank Offered Rate (HIBOR - a proxy for the risk-free rate), 
are obtained from DataStream, while proceeds, total assets, age and earnings before interest and tax 
(EBIT) are hand-collected from IPO prospectuses.  
 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 
5.1 Univariate Analysis  
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of our sample. The average initial return associated with 
our sample is 15.2%, which is consistent with the level of underpricing reported by earlier studies 
on the Hong Kong IPO market (see, e.g., Cheung et al., 1993; Chang et al., 2014; McGuiness, 
1992; Morales-Camarogo, 2013). The average values of the offer price, IPO proceeds and total 
assets during the sample period are HK$2.664, HK$1,640 million and HK$38.6 billion, 
respectively. Table 1 shows that Hong Kong IPOs are generally more mature (average age about 19 
years) than UK or US IPOs (see, e.g., Espenlaub et al., 2012; Hensler et al., 1997).  
Table 1 also reports the descriptive statistics for the pre- and post-mandatory clawback 
provision periods. The average values of the raw initial returns (IPO proceeds) are significantly 
higher (lower) in the pre- than post-clawback period. Post-clawback IPOs are younger and 
underwritten by more reputable underwriters, as measured by the gross proceeds and the number of 
IPOs underwritten two years prior to the IPO. The average allocation-adjusted initial returns are 
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lower than the risk-free rate, but the magnitude of the mean is significantly larger in the pre- than in 
the post-clawback period.
16
 Allocation-adjusted initial returns are corrected for rationing, while raw 
initial returns assume full allocations.  
Over the full sample period, investors who applied for between 1k and 50k shares were, on 
average, allocated 30% of their application size, while those who applied for more than 5M were 
allocated only 13%. Splitting the sample into pre- and post-clawback periods, we find that the IPO 
share allocation to small investors has improved significantly since the implementation of the 
clawback provision. For instance, small investors (application size 1k-50k) were allocated 24% of 
their application size in the pre-clawback period compared to 39% in the post-clawback period. In 
contrast, big investors (i.e. application size >5M) were allocated 19% of their application size in the 
pre-clawback period compared to 8% post-clawback. The difference in the share allocations 
between the pre- and post-clawback periods is economically and statistically significant for all 
investor groups. Panel B shows the number of shares allocated for different application sizes. It 
suggests that the number of shares allocated to big investors (application size >5M) decreased 
significantly following the clawback initiation.  Overall, the results in Table 1 show that the smaller 
is the application size, the higher is the allocation ratio and the number of shares allocated in the 
post-clawback period.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Table 2 reports the share allocation ratios and the allocation-adjusted initial returns for 
                                                 
16
 We follow Koh and Walter (1989) to calculate the initial returns adjusted for rationing. In Hong Kong, retail investors are required 
to make full payment up front for the shares they apply for. We calculate the interest cost for each application size from the 
application closing date to the refund date. We account for total trading costs, which comprise the brokerage fee, the SFC transaction 
levy, the investor protection levy, the SEHK trading fee, and the selling costs. For the selling costs, we use a figure of 0.415%, as 
suggested by Fung et al. (2004). The fixed cost is assumed to be HK$100 for all application sizes, to cover the various application 
costs (see McGuiness, 1999). 
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different application sizes in the pre- and post-clawback-provision periods. Panel A presents the 
share allocations without rationing for the six groups of investors. The share allocations are 
tabulated by initial returns (overpriced vs underpriced) for the pre- and post-clawback periods. We 
find that investors who applied for between 1k and 50k shares received more of the overpriced 
issues than those who applied for over 5M shares in the pre-clawback period. However, in the post-
clawback period, the small investors (1k-50k) were allocated more of the underpriced shares than 
they were of the overpriced ones (30% vs 22%). For big investors (>5M), the allocation of 
underpriced shares has been significantly lower in the post- than in the pre-clawback period (12% 
vs 8%).  
Panel B shows the allocation results for the pre- and post-clawback periods, adjusted for 
rationing. We find that small investors were allocated a higher (lower) proportion of their 
application size in the overpriced (underpriced) offerings in the pre-clawback period (39% vs 25%). 
In contrast, big investors were allocated 22% of their application size in overpriced stocks and 15% 
in underpriced ones. However, since the clawback provision has been in place, small investors have 
been allocated 23% of their application size in overpriced stocks compared to 32% in underpriced 
offerings. By contrast, big investors have been allocated 7% of their application size in overpriced 
stocks and 9% in the underpriced ones. The changes in the allocations to both small and big 
investors following the clawback initiation are significant at the 1% level. Together, these findings 
suggest that small investors have benefited the most from the clawback provision. We also find 
evidence that the benefits of the clawback provision gradually reduce as we move towards the 
larger application sizes. For example, for application sizes over five million shares, investors are 
allocated significantly less of the underpriced offerings in the post- than in the pre-clawback 
provision period (8.092% vs. 11.989%).  
Panel C reports the allocation-adjusted initial returns by overpriced and underpriced stocks, 
and by period, pre- and post-clawback provision. We find that, prior to the clawback provision 
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implementation, small investors earned -5.9% in the overpriced offerings compared to -5.7% for 
big investors. In the underpriced offerings, small investors earned 3.6%, while big investors earned 
0.49%. Following the introduction of clawback, small investors have earned -2.6% from overpriced 
offerings and 4.6% from underpriced ones. In contrast, big investors have earned -3.7% and 0.32% 
in the overpriced and underpriced offerings, respectively. Collectively, the results in Panel C 
suggest that small investors have earned positive allocation-adjusted initial returns since the 
mandatory clawback initiation and have benefited the most from its introduction. 
 
 [Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
5.2 Multivariate Analysis    
We aim to investigate the relationship between the allocation and initial returns for six investor 
groups with different application sizes (i.e., 1-50k; >50k-100k; >100k-600k; >600k-1M; >1M-5M; 
and >5M), under the effect of the mandatory clawback provision. We use the following Tobit 
regression to examine the influence of initial returns on share allocations at the time of listing: 
 
Allocation = α + β1Initialreturn + β2Clawback + β3Bookbuilding 
+ λControl + φYDUM + ψINDDUM + ε,                                                (1) 
 
 where Allocation is the percentage of shares allocated to an investor at the time of listing; 
Initialreturn is the difference between the closing price on the first day of trading and the offer price 
divided by the offer price; Clawback is a dummy variable with a value of one for IPOs issued after 
the clawback initiation and zero otherwise; Bookbuilding is a dummy variable taking a value of one 
for bookbuilding offerings and zero otherwise; Control  is the a vector of control variables, which 
includes underwriter reputation (Underwriter), a dummy variable with a value of one if the market 
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capitalization and the number of IPO firms taken public by the underwriter over the last two years 
are above the median, and zero otherwise, Earnings Before Interest and Tax (EBIT), size as 
measured by the book value of assets (LnBVA), the amount raised at the time of listing 
(Lnproceeds), and age at the time of listing (LnAge); YDUM and INDDUM are year and industry 
dummies, respectively.  
Equation (1) is estimated separately for investor groups with different application sizes. A 
negative and significant β1 would suggest that the higher the initial returns the lower the share 
allocation. We expect this effect to be more pronounced for small application sizes than for large 
ones. If the clawback provision improves the allocation to small investors, we expect β2 to be 
positive and significant for small application sizes and negative or zero for large application sizes. 
IPO firms choose different listing methods, between bookbuilding and fixed-price offerings. 
Typically, IPO firms that use bookbuilding are likely to allocate more shares to investors with larger 
application sizes. We test the impact of the listing method using a dummy variable that takes a 
value of one if the IPO firm uses a bookbuilding method and zero otherwise. If the bookbuilding 
has a positive impact on the share allocation, we expect a positive and significant β3. We control for 
underwriter reputation, EBIT, size, proceeds, and age at the time of listing. We further control for 
industry and year of listing.  
 Model 1 of Table 3 presents the results of Tobit regression for application sizes between 1k 
and 50k. The significantly negative coefficient on Initialreturn suggests that allocation to small 
investors is lower when the initial returns are high. The coefficient on Clawback is positive and 
significant at the 5% level, indicating that the clawback provision has improved share allocations to 
small investors. It is evident from the table that the use of the bookbuilding listing method has a 
positive impact on the share allocation. The negative coefficients on LnBVA and LnAge imply that 
small investors are allocated fewer shares of large and mature IPO. We find similar results for larger 
application sizes (Models 2 through 6). However, for the largest application sizes (Model 6), the 
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negative coefficient for the raw initial returns is nearly half of that for the smallest application sizes 
(-0.128 vs -0.231 in Model 1). Furthermore, the clawback provision has a negative and significant 
effect on large application sizes, but a positive and significant effect on small ones. These findings 
are consistent with the regulator’s objectives to bringing some fairness to the market in terms of 
allocating shares among different investor groups.  
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
 Allocation-adjusted initial returns (Adj-Initialreturn) can also influence the share allocations 
at the time of listing. Similar to the case of initial returns, we expect lower share allocations when 
allocation-adjusted initial returns are higher and we expect the effect to be stronger for smaller 
application sizes. To test these predictions, we re-estimate Equation (1) using Adj-Initialreturn, 
instead of Initialreturn, as an explanatory variable.  
Table 4 shows the relationship between share allocation and allocation-adjusted initial returns 
for different application sizes. The significantly negative coefficient on Adj-Initialreturn in Model 1 
suggests that small investors receive fewer shares of IPOs with higher allocation-adjusted initial 
returns. Again, for largest application size (Model 6), the magnitude of the coefficient on Adj-
Initialreturn is significantly lower than that of the smallest application size (Model 1) (-0.027 vs. -
1.327). The coefficients on Clawback in Models 1 through 3 are positive and significant at the 5% 
level, indicating that the clawback provision has improved share allocations to investors with 
relatively small application sizes. For larger application sizes, the coefficients on Clawback are 
either insignificant (Models 4 and 5) or significantly negative (Model 6), consistent with the results 
reported in Table 3. We also find similar effects, on average, for the other control variables.  
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
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 To investigate whether the clawback provision has improved the share allocations in 
underpriced issues for small investors, we interact the clawback dummy with the initial returns in 
the following Tobit regression: 
 
Allocation = α + β1Initialreturn + β2Clawback + β3Initialreturn x Clawback + β4Bookbuilding 
+ λControl + φYDUM + ψINDDUM + ε.                                                (2) 
 
Comparing the coefficient on Clawback across different application groups, a positive β3 would 
indicate that the clawback provision has improved share allocations to that particular group. Model 
1 in Table 5 shows that initial returns are negative and significantly related to the share allocation, 
consistent with the results in Tables 3 and 4. Our main variable of interest is Initialreturn x 
Clawback. Models 1 through 4 show that coefficients on Initialreturn x Clawback associated with 
the applications between 1k and 1M are positive and significant. However, for applications over 
1M, the coefficients on this interaction term are significantly negative (in Models 5 and 6). Taken 
together, these results suggest that the SEHK regulator has succeeded in protecting small investors 
through the introduction of the clawback provision. 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
 Finally, we re-estimate Equation (2) replacing Initialreturn with Adj-Initialreturn and report 
the results in Table 6. Model 1 shows that the coefficient on Adj-Initialreturn is negative and 
significant, while that on the interaction term (Adj-Initialreturn x Clawback) is positive and 
significant. This finding also holds for all investors who applied for up to 1M shares (i.e. Models 2 
to 4). However, the coefficient on the interaction term associated with investors who applied for 
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over 5M shares is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level (Model 6), implying that 
big investors are allocated less of the heavily underpriced offerings following the implementation of 
the mandatory clawback provision. Overall, the results in Table 6 suggest that smaller investors 
have earned positive returns in the post-clawback period, while larger investors (i.e., those with 
application sizes of more than 5M) have earned negative returns. 
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
5.3. Robustness checks 
In this section, we investigate the reliability of our results by performing a number of robustness 
tests. We summarize the results of these tests in Table 7. First, we re-estimate Equation (2) 
replacing Adj-Initialreturn with the market-adjusted initial returns (MRK-Initialreturn), defined as 
the raw returns subtracted by the contemporaneous Hang Seng Index (HIS) value-weighted returns. 
Our results (see Panel A) remain qualitatively the same as those in Table 6, implying that our 
findings are not driven by changes in the required risk premium across pre- and post-clawback 
provision periods. 
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 Second, we examine the sensitivity of our results to the inclusion of additional control 
variables in our models. We include the subscription rate for retail tranche (SUBRATE), defined as 
the number of share subscribed by individual investors divided by the number of shares assigned to 
the retail tranche, turnover on the first day of trading (TURNOVER), estimated as the total trading 
volume dividend by the number of shares offered at the time of listing.
17
 We also include a crisis 
                                                 
17
 Jiang and Li (2014) use SUBRATE and TURNOVER as proxies of the pre-market and aftermarket sentiment, 
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dummy (CRISIS), which takes the value of one for IPOs issued between 2007 and 2008, and zero 
otherwise, and the hotness of the IPO market (HOT), measured as the number of IPO issued in a 
given year divided by the number of IPOs issued over the entire sample period as additional 
controls in Equation (2). Our results (see Panel B) remain largely unchanged, indicating that our 
earlier results are unlikely to be the outcome of changes in investor sentiment, market conditions or 
Global financial crisis.   
 Third, we use two-stage instrumental Tobit model to account for the possibility that 
allocations are endogenously determined by the same forces that affect market adjusted initial 
returns. In the first stage, we regress the market adjusted initial returns on offer size, offer price, 
book building, underwriter reputation, market returns, IPO hotness and turnover on the first day of 
trading.
18
 In the second stage, we use the instrumental market adjusted initial returns estimated 
from the first stage as an explanatory variable in the allocation equation. The results in Panel C of 
Table 7 are qualitatively similar to those in Table 6, implying that our results not driven by 
endogeneity. Further we use Wald test to examine whether market adjusted initial returns is 
exogenous to allocations. In Panel C, the Wald test is not statistically significant at any 
conventional level, indicating that endogeneity does not pose a serious problem in our empirical 
tests. 
 Finally, to exclude any confounding effect from the introduction of the Hong Kong 
Securities and Futures Ordinance in April 2003, which changed the regulation and disclosure 
requirements on price stabilization activities, we re-estimate Equation (2) using data for the period 
January 1990 to March 2003. The results in Panel D show that our conclusions are affected by the 
2003 regulatory changes.     
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
respectively. 
18
 These control variables are employed by Banerjee, Dai and Shrestha (2011) as determinants of initial returns.  
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
This study investigates the impact of the mandatory clawback provision on underwriters’ IPO share 
allocation and the allocation-adjusted returns for various investor groups in Hong Kong. Consistent 
with the winner’s curse, we show that the ability of investors to earn positive initial returns is 
minimal, due to greater allocations of overpriced IPOs and smaller allocations of underpriced 
issues. Interestingly, we find that the mandatory clawback provision has favored retail investors and 
enhanced their chances of receiving more of the underpriced IPOs and less of the overpriced ones. 
Furthermore, we show that the pre- (post-) mandatory-clawback allocation-adjusted returns earned 
by different investor groups are significantly lower than (not significantly different from) the risk-
free rate. Finally, we show that the mandatory clawback provision has significantly improved share 
allocations to small investors. Our results provide support for the view that the mandatory clawback 
provision has reduced the winner’s curse and brought about an element of fairness among investors. 
The results also show that the Hong Kong regulatory authorities should resist the deregulation 
pressure to scrap the clawback provision, and other countries should consider introducing similar 
provisions to maintain fairness in IPO share allocations. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
This table presents descriptive statistics for a total of 909 Hong Kong IPOs issued over the period 1990-2010. The sample is also stratified into two groups. 
The first group contains 389 IPOs, which were issued prior to the mandatory clawback provision initiation (i.e. prior to 26 June 1998) and the second 
group includes the 520 IPOs offered following the introduction of the mandatory clawback provision. Panel A reports the descriptive statistics of the 
following variables: Offer price is the price offered at the IPO; Raw initial returns is the difference between the closing price on the first day of trading and 
the offer price divided by the offer price; Proceeds are the amount raised at the time of listing; Total assets are the total assets of the IPO firm at the time of 
listing; Age is the age of the IPO firm measured as the difference between the IPO date and the founding date; Underwriters is a dummy variable taking a 
value of one if the market capitalization and the number of IPO firms taken public by the underwriter over the last two years are above the median and 
zero otherwise; EBIT is the earnings before interest and tax at the time of listing; Allocation-adjusted initial returns are initial returns adjusted for inflation 
and transaction costs and measured using Rock's model; Allocation is the percentage of shares allocated to investors at the time of listing based on 
application size. Panel B shows the number of shares allocated for different application sizes. The Z-scores from the Mann–Whitney test are reported to 
assess the difference in these variables before and after the adoption of the mandatory clawback provision. 
 
Panel A: 
Variables 
Full sample   Pre clawback   Post clawback 
Z-Score Mean Median STD   Mean Median STD   Mean Median STD 
             Offer price 2.664 1.300 5.219 
 
2.002 1.130 2.833 
 
3.159 1.735 6.410 -5.907 
Raw initial returns 0.152 0.071 0.327 
 
0.213 0.109 0.411 
 
0.107 0.076 0.238 4.003 
Proceeds (M) 1640.000 201.000 6060.000 
 
478.000 111.000 1790.000 
 
2520.000 487.000 7750.000 -8.530 
Total assets (HK$ billions) 38.600 0.001 423.000   1.302 0.307 3.235   67.900 0.394 559.000 -15.256 
Age 18.712 14.000 16.276 
 
21.032 15.000 18.848 
 
17.018 13.000 13.882 3.381 
Underwriters 0.227 0.000 0.419 
 
0.4113 0.0000 0.4927 
 
0.881 0.000 0.284 11.498 
EBIT (HK$ Millions) 137.437 66.035 417.851 
 
87.001 31.000 244.003 
 
187.872 101.071 591.700 -16.733 
Adjusted initial returns -0.008 -0.004 0.093 
 
-0.0166 -0.0057 0.1014 
 
-0.002 -0.001 0.085 -2.020 
Allocations (1k-50k) 30.165 15.733 38.730 
 
23.819 11.444 37.408 
 
38.633 20.266 38.892 12.275 
Allocations (>50k-100k) 23.592 14.618 35.527 
 
17.871 10.226 32.342 
 
31.225 19.352 38.103 12.622 
Allocations (>100k-600k) 20.611 13.773 33.204 
 
14.636 10.203 28.592 
 
28.582 17.004 37.074 12.859 
Allocations (>600k-1M) 19.306 13.500 31.610 
 
26.183 16.390 34.745 
 
14.152 10.166 27.986 12.484 
Allocations  (>1M-5M) 17.121 13.557 29.607 
 
23.869 17.954 33.286 
 
12.063 10.232 25.399 12.327 
Allocations (>5M) 12.691 9.328 27.082 
 
18.966 12.578 31.389 
 
7.987 5.059 22.236 9.266 
No of obs. 909       389           520   
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Table 1 continues 
 
 
             Panel B: Number of shares allocated to investors with different application sizes 
# of shares (1k-50k) 779,298 163,852 3,539,032 
 
718,067 89,179 4,337,642 
 
860,991 320,722 2,036,498 -11.360 
# of shares (>50k-100k) 274,261 57,516 1,140,675 
 
217,957 100,000 332,898 
 
316,462 24,900 1,480,229 7.832 
# of shares (>100k-600k) 1,784,840 293,661 5,999,595 
 
1,086,661 47,781 4,740,664 
 
2,716,344 665,175 7,253,792 -14.815 
# of shares (>600k-1M) 1,357,796 359,676 2,612,058 
 
1,847,532 891,000 2,679,865 
 
990,730 49,416 2,500,428 13.643 
# of shares  (>1M-5M) 721,792 195,000 1,609,699 
 
901,476 420,922 1,722,492 
 
587,115 50,668 1,507,379 9.885 
# of shares (>5M) 1,140,253 72,810 2,543,040 
 
1,792,135 674,850 341,0231 
 
651,656 28,194 1,433,263 8.278 
No of obs 909       389           520   
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
This table shows the percentage of allocations based on the size of application. Allocations (1k-50k) is the average percentage of shares allocated to 
investors who applied for between 1,000 and 50,000 shares at the time of listing. Allocations (>50k-100k) is the average percentage of shares allocated to 
investors who applied for between 50,000 and 100,000 shares at the time of listing. Allocations (>100k-600k) is the average percentage of shares allocated 
to investors who applied for between 100,000 and 600,000 shares at the time of listing. Allocations (>600k-1M) is the average percentage of shares 
allocated to investors who applied for between 600,000 and 1 million shares at the time of listing. Allocations (>1M-5M) is the average percentage of 
shares allocated to investors who applied for between 1 and 5 million shares at the time of listing. Allocations (>5M) is the average percentage shares 
allocated to investors who applied for more than 5 million shares at the time of listing. Panel A shows the results of the allocations without rationing in the 
pre- and post-clawback periods. Panel B shows the results of the allocations with rationing, while Panel C shows the initial returns for different application 
sizes adjusted for rationing. T-test overpriced is the t-test of the difference in overpriced issues between pre- and post-clawback periods. T-test underpriced 
is the t-test of the difference in underpriced issues between pre- and post-clawback periods.    
 
Panel A: Allocation without rationing 
Number of shares 
Pre clawback 
 
Post clawback T-test T-test 
Overpriced Underpriced 
 
Overpriced Underpriced Overpriced Underpriced 
Allocations (1k-50k) 67.515 27.323 
 
22.229 29.773 -2.328 -8.191 
Allocations (>50k-100k) 58.909 21.774 
 
16.090 25.796 -2.276 -7.842 
Allocations (>100k-600k) 55.806 17.988 
 
13.115 19.288 -2.714 -8.412 
Allocations (>600k-1M) 51.876 17.412 
 
12.487 18.822 -2.279 -7.823 
Allocations  (>1M-5M) 48.281 15.536 
 
10.676 15.117 -2.444 -7.979 
Allocations (>5M) 39.403 11.989 
 
7.940 8.092 -2.194 -8.209 
No of obs 290 99   357 163     
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Table 2 continued
  Pre clawback 
 
Post clawback T-test T-test 
Panel C : Allocation-adjusted initial returns Overpriced Underpriced 
 
Overpriced Underpriced Overpriced Underpriced 
Allocations (1k-50k) -0.0590 0.0360 
 
-0.0264 0.0459 -2.4120 -2.010 
Allocations (>50k-100k) -0.0555 0.0176 
 
-0.0360 0.0273 -2.203 -2.419 
Allocations (>100k-600k) -0.0530 0.0181 
 
-0.0270 0.0236 -3.433 -2.327 
Allocations (>600k-1M) -0.0480 0.0191 
 
-0.0280 0.0245 -2.813 -2.695 
Allocations  (>1M-5M) 0.0000 0.0182 
 
-0.0010 0.0153 -1.584 2.594 
Allocations (>5M) -0.0571 0.0049 
 
-0.0367 0.0032 -7.369 2.819 
No of obs 158 231 
 
249 271 
  
Panel B: Allocation with rationing             
Allocations (1k-50k) 38.647 24.688 
 
22.877 31.612 -4.283 -3.931 
Allocations (>50k-100k) 33.453 18.651 
 
17.026 27.967 -3.277 -4.521 
Allocations (>100k-600k) 31.851 16.253 
 
12.883 23.803 -3.691 -4.991 
Allocations (>600k-1M) 29.239 15.273 
 
12.936 21.715 -3.023 -4.745 
Allocations  (>1M-5M) 27.027 19.253 
 
10.536 13.470 -3.328 -4.832 
Allocations (>5M) 21.771 14.864 
 
6.687 9.187 -3.573 -4.793 
No of obs 158 231   249 271     
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Table 3: Regression results 
The dependent variable (Allocation) is the percentage of shares allocated to an investor at the time of listing. RawInitialreturn is the raw initial returns, 
defined as the difference between the closing price on the first day of trading and the offer price divided by the offer price. Clawback is a dummy variable 
taking a value of one for IPOs in the clawback provision period and zero otherwise. Bookbuilding is a dummy variable taking a value of one if the IPO is a 
bookbuilding offering and zero otherwise. Underwriter is a dummy variable with a value of one if the market capitalization and the number of IPO firms 
taken public by the underwriter over the last two years are above the median, and zero otherwise. LnEBIT is the natural logarithm of the earnings before interest 
and tax.. LnBVA is natural logarithm of the book value of assets. Lnproceeds is the natural logarithm of amount raised at the time of listing. LnAge is the 
natural logarithm of age at the time of listing. The values in brackets are the p-values. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
  
Allocation 
(1k-50k) 
Allocation 
(>50k-100k) 
Allocation 
(>100k-600k) 
Allocation 
(>600k-1M) 
Allocation 
(>1M-5M) 
Allocation 
(>5M) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
RawInitialreturn -0.231*** -0.224*** -0.215*** -0.201*** -0.194*** -0.128*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Clawback 0.112** 0.022** 0.019** 0.018* -0.002 -0.084* 
 
(0.018) (0.037) (0.042) (0.080) (0.983) (0.092) 
Bookbuilding 0.060** 0.057** 0.047* 0.046* 0.039* 0.016 
 
(0.023) (0.044) (0.083) (0.085) (0.095) (0.115) 
Underwriter 0.028 0.009 0.005 0.006 0.014 0.016 
 
(0.231) (0.721) (0.844) (0.811) (0.538) (0.436) 
LnEBIT 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.005 
 
(0.401) (0.507) (0.590) (0.677) (0.806) (0.163) 
LnBVA -0.014*** -0.010** -0.009** -0.009** -0.007* -0.004* 
 
(0.004) (0.041) (0.046) (0.032) (0.061) (0.086) 
Lnproceeds 0.020** 0.014 0.008 0.006 0.008 0.004 
 
(0.025) (0.129) (0.327) (0.414) (0.360) (0.659) 
LnAge -0.027** -0.026* -0.026* -0.022* -0.011 0.001 
 (0.034) (0.069) (0.051) (0.086) (0.391) (0.978) 
Constant 0.190* 0.188 0.277** 0.182 0.233 -0.017 
 (0.067) (0.114) (0.031) (0.187) (0.171) (0.926) 
No of obs 909 909 909 909 909 909 
Industry and Year Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Prob>F 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Likelihood ratio -2.270 -54.400 -20.460 -2.820 33.410 76.500 
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Table 4: Regression results 
The dependent variable (Allocation) is the percentage of shares allocated to an investor at the time of listing. Adj-Initialreturn is the raw initial return adjusted for 
transaction costs and measured using Rock's model. Clawback is a dummy variable taking a value of one for IPOs in the clawback provision period and zero otherwise. 
Bookbuilding is a dummy variable taking a value of one if the IPO is a bookbuilding offering and zero otherwise. Underwriter is a dummy variable with a value of one if 
the market capitalization and the number of IPO firms taken public by the underwriter over the last two years are above the median, and zero otherwise. LnEBIT is the 
natural logarithm of the earnings before interest and tax. LnBVA is natural logarithm of the book value of assets. Lnproceeds is the natural logarithm of amount raised at 
the time of listing. LnAge is the natural logarithm of age at the time of listing. The values in brackets are the p-values. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  
Allocation 
(1k-50k) 
Allocation 
(>50k-100k) 
Allocation 
(>100k-600k) 
Allocation 
(>600k-1M) 
Allocation 
(>1M-5M) 
Allocation 
(>5M) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Adj-Initialreturn -1.327*** -1.250*** -1.119*** -0.846*** -0.700*** -0.027*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Clawback 0.143** 0.125** 0.101* 0.078 -0.077 -0.111* 
 
(0.046) (0.048) (0.056) (0.535) (0.361) (0.087) 
Bookbuilding 0.046* 0.045* 0.056** 0.054** 0.010 0.016 
 
(0.076) (0.077) (0.047) (0.046) (0.667) (0.217) 
Underwriter 0.006 0.016 0.021 0.024 0.041* 0.010 
 
(0.795) (0.499) (0.384) (0.256) (0.084) (0.461) 
LnEBIT 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.004 -0.001 
 
(0.477) (0.587) (0.371) (0.216) (0.331) (0.752) 
LnBVA -0.011** -0.011** -0.013** -0.004 -0.015*** -0.003* 
 
(0.014) (0.015) (0.010) (0.352) (0.003) (0.098) 
Lnproceeds 0.015* 0.011 0.022* 0.001 0.025** 0.001 
 
(0.093) (0.215) (0.060) (0.878) (0.035) (0.818) 
Lnage -0.033*** -0.027** -0.034*** -0.002 -0.033** -0.003 
 
(0.008) (0.022) (0.010) (0.448) (0.011) (0.710) 
Constant 0.089 0.027 0.048 -0.102 0.092 0.149 
 
(0.539) (0.854) (0.715) (0.587) (0.402) (0.120) 
No of obs 909 909 909 909 909 909 
Industry and Year Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Prob>F 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Likelihood ratio 3.270 -41.230 -16.610 19.420 515.230 80.420 
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Table 5: Regression results  
The dependent variable (Allocation) is the percentage of shares allocated to an investor at the time of listing. RawInitialreturn is the difference between the closing price 
on the first day of trading and the offer price divided by the offer price. Clawback is a dummy variable taking a value of one for IPOs in the clawback provision period 
and zero otherwise. Bookbuilding is a dummy variable taking a value of one if the IPO is a bookbuilding offering and zero otherwise. Underwriter is a dummy variable 
with a value of one if the market capitalization and the number of IPO firms taken public by the underwriter over the last two years are above the median, and zero 
otherwise. LnEBIT is the natural logarithm of the earnings before interest and tax. LnBVA is the natural logarithm of the book value of assets. Lnproceeds is the natural 
logarithm of the amount raised at the time of listing. LnAge is the natural logarithm of the age at the time of listing. The values in brackets are the p-values. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  
Allocation 
(1k-50k) 
Allocation 
(>50k-100k) 
Allocation 
(>100k-600k) 
Allocation 
(>600k-1M) 
Allocation 
(>1M-5M) 
Allocation 
(>5M) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
RawInitialreturn -0.309*** -0.291*** -0.281*** -0.261*** -0.251*** -0.186*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Clawback 0.017 0.021 0.020 0.113 -0.003 -0.085* 
 
(0.812) (0.900) (0.813) (0.269) (0.977) (0.054) 
Clawback x RawInitialreturn 0.223*** 0.196*** 0.189*** 0.173** -0.164* -0.169* 
 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.039) (0.086) (0.081) 
Bookbuilding 0.054** 0.051** 0.042* 0.040* 0.034 0.011 
 
(0.043) (0.042) (0.082) (0.098) (0.111) (0.657) 
Underwriter 0.030 0.010 -0.003 0.007 0.015 0.017 
 
(0.202) (0.674) (0.892) (0.767) (0.499) (0.397) 
LnEBIT 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.004 
 
(0.557) (0.653) (0.751) (0.825) (0.669) (0.244) 
LnBVA -0.013*** -0.010* -0.008* -0.009** -0.007* -0.004 
 
(0.005) (0.051) (0.057) (0.039) (0.094) (0.422) 
Lnproceeds 0.020** 0.014 0.008 0.006 0.008 0.003 
 
(0.024) (0.127) (0.321) (0.408) (0.359) (0.672) 
Lnage -0.027** -0.026* -0.026** -0.022* -0.010 0.001 
 (0.031) (0.066) (0.048) (0.082) (0.385) (0.475) 
Constant 0.180* 0.180 0.269** 0.174 0.226 -0.024 
 (0.077) (0.125) (0.033) (0.200) (0.182) (0.895) 
No of obs 909 909 909 909 909 909 
Industry and Year Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Prob>F 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Likelihood ratio -5.030 -56.150 -19.180 -1.040 33.260 79.030 
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Table 6: Regression results 
The dependent variable (Allocation) is the percentage of shares allocated to an investor at the time of listing. Adj-Initialreturn is the raw initial return adjusted for 
transaction costs and measured using Rock's model. Clawback is a dummy variable taking a value of one for IPOs in the clawback provision period and zero otherwise. 
Bookbuilding is a dummy variable taking a value of one if the IPO is a bookbuilding offering and zero otherwise. Underwriter is a dummy variable with a value of one if 
the market capitalization and the number of IPO firms taken public by the underwriter over the last two years are above the median, and zero otherwise. LnEBIT is the 
natural logarithm of the earnings before interest and tax. LnBVA is the natural logarithm of the book value of assets. Lnproceeds is the natural logarithm of the amount 
raised at the time of listing. LnAge is the natural logarithm of the age at the time of listing. The values in brackets are the p-values. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  
Allocation 
(1k-50k) 
Allocation 
(>50k-100k) 
Allocation 
(>100k-600k) 
Allocation 
(>600k-1M) 
Allocation 
(>1M-5M) 
Allocation 
(>5M) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Adj-Initialreturn -1.788*** -1.738*** -1.482*** -1.200*** -1.106*** 0.028*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Clawback 0.211** 0.179** 0.177** 0.137* -0.054 -0.124* 
 
(0.022) (0.032) (0.47) (0.095) (0.537) (0.076) 
Clawback x Adj-Initialreturn 1.234*** 1.039*** 0.989*** 0.943** -0.001 -0.736* 
 
(0.001) (0.005) (0.024) (0.000) (0.634) (0.096) 
Bookbuilding 0.048* 0.048* 0.059** 0.058** 0.016 -0.016 
 
(0.056) (0.058) (0.034) (0.028) (0.486) (0.220) 
Underwriter 0.013 0.004 0.019 0.038 0.023 0.010 
 
(0.575) (0.875) (0.441) (0.109) (0.267) (0.497) 
LnEBIT 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.001 
 
(0.816) (0.618) (0.493) (0.477) (0.341) (0.669) 
LnBVA -0.009** -0.010** -0.011** -0.013*** -0.004 -0.003 
 
(0.025) (0.023) (0.017) (0.004) (0.402) (0.288) 
Lnproceeds 0.009 0.013* 0.020** 0.023** -0.002 0.002 
 
(0.167) (0.095) (0.049) (0.015) (0.818) (0.775) 
Lnage -0.025** -0.031** -0.032** -0.029** -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.034) (0.013) (0.015) (0.023) (0.893) (0.722) 
Constant -0.036 0.020 -0.015 -0.001 -0.123 0.129 
 (0.810) (0.897) (0.917) (0.993) (0.512) (0.182) 
No of obs 909 909 909 909 909 909 
Industry and Year Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Prob>F 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Likelihood ratio -5.620 -37.440 13.250 34.890 511.890 89.430 
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Table 7: Regression results 
The dependent variable (Allocation) is the percentage of shares allocated to an investor at the time of listing. Panel A shows the regression results when the initial returns are adjusted for the 
market returns. MRK-Initialreturn is the initial returns adjusted for the market, defined as the raw returns subtracted by the contemporaneous Hang Seng Index (HIS) value-weighted return. 
Clawback is a dummy variable taking a value of one for IPOs in the clawback provision period and zero otherwise. Other control variables include Bookbuilding, Underwriter, LnEBIT, 
LnBVA, and LnAge, which are previously defined. Panel B includes additional control variables, namely the subscription rate for retail tranche (SUBRATE), defined as the number of share 
subscribed by individual investors divided by the number of shares assigned to the retail tranche, turnover on the first day of trading (TURNOVER), defined as the total trading volume 
divided by the number of shares offered at the time of listing, a crisis dummy (CRISIS), which takes the value of one for IPOs issued between 2007 and 2008, and zero otherwise, and the 
hotness of the IPO market (HOT), measured as the number of IPO issued in a given year divided by the number of IPOs issued over the entire sample period. Panel C shows the regression 
results after controlling for endogeneity and Panel D shows the regression results for a subsample up to March 2003.The values in brackets are the p-values. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  
Allocation 
(1k-50k) 
Allocation 
(>50k-100k) 
Allocation 
(>100k-600k) 
Allocation 
(>600k-1M) 
Allocation 
(>1M-5M) 
Allocation 
(>5M) 
 Panel A: Market adjusted Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
MRK-Initialreturn -0.427*** -0.393*** -0.374*** -0.347*** -0.328*** 0.258*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Clawback 0.104*** 0.123** 0.133** 0.127** -0.039 -0.087* 
 
(0.003) (0.020) (0.039) (0.043) (0.222) (0.065) 
Clawback x Market-adjusted initial return 0.310*** 0.279*** 0.271*** 0.250*** -0.036* -0.136* 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.061) (0.052) 
Other Control variables Y Y Y Y Y Y 
No of obs 909 909 909 909 909 909 
Industry and Year Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Prob>F 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Likelihood ratio -149.47 -157.52 -115.16 -94.05 -45.48 -9.96 
  
  
Allocation 
(1k-50k) 
Allocation 
(>50k-100k) 
Allocation 
(>100k-600k) 
Allocation 
(>600k-1M) 
Allocation 
(>1M-5M) 
Allocation 
(>5M) 
 Panel B: Sentiment and Global crisis Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
MRK-Initialreturn -0.362*** -0.347*** -0.330*** -0.300*** -0.288*** -0.221*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Clawback 0.118** 0.117** 0.109*** 0.104*** -0.105** -0.108** 
 
(0.037) (0.029) (0.003) (0.003) (0.041) (0.031) 
Clawback x MRK-Initialreturn 0.263*** 0.235*** 0.228*** 0.218*** -0.0215 -0.117** 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.121) (0.032) 
Other Control variables Y Y Y Y Y Y 
No of obs 909 909 909 909 909 909 
Industry and Year Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Prob>F 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Likelihood ratio -109.34 -129.13 -88.16 -66.78 -22.72 -6.88 
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Allocation 
(1k-50k) 
Allocation 
(>50k-100k) 
Allocation 
(>100k-600k) 
Allocation 
(>600k-1M) 
Allocation 
(>1M-5M) 
Allocation 
(>5M) 
 Panel C: Endogeneity Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
MRK-Initialreturn (instrumented) -0.310** -0.291** -0.339** -0.293*** -0.211** -0.206** 
 
(0.011) (0.021) (0.030) (0.010) (0.040) (0.042) 
Clawback 0.146** 0.132** 0.108** 0.103** -0.088* -0.109** 
 
(0.021) (0.031) (0.023) (0.033) (0.062) (0.011) 
Other Control variables Y Y Y Y Y Y 
No of obs 909 909 909 909 909 909 
Industry and Year Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Wald test Prob>chi2 0.220 0.240 0.206 0.383 0.376 0.216 
Prob>F 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Likelihood ratio -109.34 -129.13 -88.16 -66.78 -22.72 -6.88 
 
  
Allocation 
(1k-50k) 
Allocation 
(>50k-100k) 
Allocation 
(>100k-600k) 
Allocation 
(>600k-1M) 
Allocation 
(>1M-5M) 
Allocation 
(>5M) 
 Panel D: Jan 1990 to March 2003 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
MRK-Initialreturn -0.238*** -0.241*** -0.230*** -0.219*** -0.222*** -0.168*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) 
Clawback 0.077** 0.061* 0.058* 0.057* -0.029 -0.073* 
 
(0.045) (0.090) (0.097) (0.092) (0.183) (0.079) 
Clawback x MRK-Initialreturn 0.135** 0.145** 0.147** 0.144** -0.022 -0.114* 
 
(0.028) (0.039) (0.029) (0.047) (0.273) (0.091) 
Other Control variables Y Y Y Y Y Y 
No of obs 536 536 536 536 536 536 
Industry and Year Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Prob>F 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Likelihood ratio       -139.01 -162.34 -148.83 -131.42 -119.45 -111.86 
 
